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Is Nothing Certain but Death?
The Uncertainty Created by
California's Proposition 218
By MONA PATEL*
ON NOVEMBER 5, 1996, California voters approved Proposition
218, the "Right to Vote on Taxes Act" ("Act" or "Proposition 218").1
One provision of the Act requires voter approval before imposing or
increasing fees for property related services.2 Proposition 218 is the
most recent development in the California taxpayers' revolt, which be-
gan almost twenty years prior with Proposition 13. Proposition 13
marked the beginning of California taxpayers' expression of disap-
proval over rising taxes. 3 Proposition 13 limited government authority
to raise property taxes and prevented local governments from enact-
ing any special taxes without voter approval.4 Thus, a struggle began
between property owners wishing to exercise greater control over
their property taxes and local governments responsible for providing
services to the community. 5 This struggle has resulted in the expendi-
ture of considerable time, energy, and money by local governments
attempting to fulfill the requirements of the various property tax pro-
positions.6 Another effect has been voter rejection of some taxes and
fees submitted by local governments for financing certain services and
* Class of 2001. The author would like to thank James Copeland for his insightful
contribution to this Comment. She would also like to thank her Mom, Dad, and Patrick for
their loving support throughout law school.
1. See PROPOSITION 218 RIGHT To VOTE ON TAXES ACT § 1 (1996) (adding Article
XIIIC and Article XIIID to the California Constitution).
2. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(c).
3. SeeJACK CITRIN & FRANK LEW, THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT: THE CASE OF PROPOSI-
TION 13, 3-8 (George G. Kaufman & Kenneth T. Rosen eds., 1981).
4. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-4.
5. See CITRIN & LEVY, supra note 3, at 7.
6. See ROGER L. KEMP, COPING WITH PROPOSITION 13, 5-6 (1980).
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improvements, 7 which has meant the possibility of discontinuing es-
sential services, such as street lighting, in those communities rejecting
the fees.8
Before fulfilling the requirements imposed by the propositions
and the possible voter rejection of fees that will finance vital services,
local governments must first determine whether the fee they seek to
impose is subject to the stringent requirements of the related proposi-
tion.9 Local governments and California courts are currently con-
fronted with the issue of how to define a fee "incident of property
ownership," 10 commonly referred to as a "property related fee," for
the purpose of applying the requirements of Proposition 218.11 The
difficulty in defining the term "property related fee" stems from the
broadness of the term, which lends itself to endless interpretation. Be-
cause Proposition 218 does not provide a definition, 12 the California
courts and the California Legislature are left to sort out the resulting
confusion. 13 This Comment focuses on the confusion created by Pro-
position 218.
Proposition 218 can best be understood in the context of two sim-
ilar initiatives: Proposition 1314 and Proposition 62.15 Part I of this
7. See Charles F. Bostwick, Residents Seeking Revote on Assessments, DAILY NEWS OF L.A.,
May 12, 1998, at AVI (reporting on homeowners requesting a second election to vote on a
fee to pay for maintaining the public greenery around their neighborhoods following re-
jection of the fee one year earlier, noting "[s]ituations in which fees were approved by
homeowners in one tract and rejected by those in the tract next door have led to a peculiar
appearance for the landscaped corridors along some streets: green lawns for one block,
then brown, foot-high grass and weeds").
8. See Maria Alicia Gaura, Lights May Go Out in Some Towns in Santa Clara County, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 17, 2000, at A19 (reporting that a second vote on a tax for street lighting was
held after the first vote failed by a margin of 0.4%, noting that "[t]echnically, the lights
should have been turned out at that time"); see also Patrick McGreevy, When the Streets Go
Dark, Neighbors Will Now Know Wy, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2000, at B5 (reporting that approxi-
mately sixty-two streets lights have been turned off after residents voted against paying
taxes for the electricity bills).
9. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6.
10. Id. § 6(b)(3).
11. See Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 01
C.D.O.S. 209 (Cal. Jan. 8, 2001); Teyssier v. City of San Diego, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100 (Ct.
App. 2000), review granted and opinion superceded, 8 P.3d 338 (Cal. 2000); Action Apartment
Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., Nos. BI16056 and B117325 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
1998).
12. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2.
13. See ELIZABETH G. HILL, LEGIsLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING PROPOSI-
TION 218, at 18-19 (1996).
14. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 53720-53730 (West 1997).
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Comment discusses the history of the taxpayers' revolt 16 beginning
with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, continuing with Proposi-
tion 62 in 1982, and ending, for the time being, with Proposition
218.17 Part II discusses the confusion surrounding the application of
Proposition 218, beginning by analyzing the language of Proposition
218 itself. Part III explains why the courts should expand upon the
test the California Supreme Court used in Apartment Ass'n of Los Ange-
les County v. City of Los Angeles' 8 to determine whether an inspection
fee imposed on owners of residential rental properties was subject to
Proposition 218's requirements. 19 An expansion of the test would
broaden its scope so that all types of fees could be analyzed under it.
Under a broader test, the courts should give some deference to the
construction of the term "property related fee" adopted by the agency
charged with implementing Proposition 218.20 Adoption of this test
would simultaneously preserve the voter intent behind Proposition
218, resolve the uncertainty surrounding property related fees, and
enable local governments to structure a definition of the fee charged
to meet the changing needs of California's communities. This Com-
ment concludes that property related fees should be defined by dete r-
mining the directness of the relationship to property ownership.
16. "Taxpayers' revolt" is a term used by many authors to describe the phenomenon
whereby taxpayers overwhelmingly vote for propositions which constrict the ability of gov-
ernment to spend money and raise revenue by imposing taxes and fees. See generally
Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscal-
ization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 183 (1997); Jonathan
Throckmorton, What is a Property-Related Fee? An Interpretation of California's Proposition 218,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1059 (1997).
17. Proposition 37, which qualified for the November 2000 Ballot, would have added
another chapter to the taxpayers' revolt if it had passed. The proposition, which proposed
an amendment to the Proposition 218 language in the California Constitution, "would
[have] classifi[ed] as 'taxes' some charges that government otherwise could impose as
'fees'" and thus be subject to the voter approval requirements of Proposition 13. CAL. SEC'V
OF STATE, CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 29 (Aug. 14, 2000). The fees
that Proposition 37 attempted to reclassify are fees imposed for the "primary purpose of
addressing health, environmental, or other 'societal or economic' concerns." Id. "This pro-
position's primary fiscal effect would be to make it more difficult for government to im-
pose new regulatory charges on businesses and individuals to pay for certain programs." Id.
Proposition 37 was a response to the California Supreme Court's ruling in Sinclair Paint Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1997). See CAL. SEC'V OF STATE, supra, at 29.
Proposition 37 failed with 52.2% of voters rejecting the proposition and 47.8% voting in
favor. See Linda Haugsted, California Votes No on Fee Reform, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 13,
2000, at 66.
18. 01 C.D.O.S. 209 (Cal. Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles I1].
19. See id. at 210-12.
20. See id.; see also Amador Valley Joint Union Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
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Resolution of the issue will provide much needed guidance to local
governments in determining whether and how much time, energy,
and money they should devote to fulfilling the requirements of Pro-
position 218.
I. Background: Property Tax Initiatives
A. Proposition 13: The Taxpayers' Revolt Begins
A substantial two-to-one majority of California voters21 approved
Proposition 13 on June 6, 1978 as an amendment to the California
Constitution.2 2 This marked the beginning of the taxpayers' revolt in
California. 23 Proposition 13, also known as theJarvis-Gann initiative, 24
was seen as an outcry against "big and more expensive government."25
Taxpayers were frustrated with the government's inability to provide
services at a reasonable cost. 26 As stated at the time of its passage:
Many taxpayers feel that garbage is seldom collected on schedule,
law enforcement is lax, schools fail to teach children how to read,
street potholes seem to multiply... traffic congestion makes driv-
ing an ordeal, and at times city hall seems incapable of answering
even the most elementary questions.
Underlying this public disaffection with inadequate govern-
ment performance is the view that as government performance de-
creases, taxes increase. 27
When Proposition 13 was passed, taxes in California were growing
more rapidly than in other states. 28 Although taxpayers in California
wanted cutbacks in government spending and taxes, they did not want
fewer government services. 29 Rather, people generally opposed cut-
backs in the police and fire departments, education, public transpor-
tation, and recreational facilities. 30 However, voters felt that the
21. See ROBERT LAMB & STEPHEN P. RAPPAPORT, MUNICIPAL BONDS: THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE REVIEW OF TAx-EXEMPT SECURITIES AND PUBLIC FINANCE 20 (Kiril Sokoloff & Chet Gott-
fried eds., 1980). The final vote was 65% in favor and 35% against Proposition 13. See
KEMP, supra note 6, at 6.
22. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
23. See CITRIN & LEW, supra note 3, at 1.
24. See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 21, at 20.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 20-21.
28. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 185-86 (noting that "had Proposition 13 failed, the
homeowners' property tax bill would have almost doubled between 1974 and 1978").
29. See CITRIN & LEVY, supra note 3, at 14-15. Fifty-eight percent of voters favored
spending cuts in less than four of fifteen spending areas. See id. at 15. Half of these voters
supported Proposition 13. See id. Forty-seven percent of voters that favored spending more
in at least three areas voted for Proposition 13. See id.
30. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 186.
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government could provide the same level of services even with a signif-
icant reduction in taxes.31 With the passage of Proposition 13, local
governments were faced with the difficult task of providing adequate
services to their constituents with shrinking revenue streams.32 Follow-
ing Proposition 13's implementation, the revenue generated by the
property tax dropped by 52.5%, to $5.561 billion in fiscal year
1978-79.33 Local governments were under pressure to find ways to
finance the services that were once provided with a much larger
budget. 34 Accordingly, spending levels for a variety of programs were
dramatically reduced; to meet smaller budgets, 1,100 out of 2,150 li-
brary branches throughout California were closed due to Proposition
13.35
Voters approved Proposition 13 as an amendment to the Califor-
nia Constitution, with its provisions incorporated into Article XIIIA.3 6
Its principal provisions limit ad valorem property taxes37 to one per-
cent of a property's assessed valuation 38 and limit increases in the as-
sessed valuation to two percent per year unless there is a change in
ownership of the property.39 In addition, Proposition 13 prevents lo-
cal governments from circumventing the above limitations by prohib-
iting counties, cities, and special districts from enacting any "special
tax" without a two-thirds vote of the electorate. 40
Confusion arose over the term "special tax" in section 4 of Article
XIIIA.4 1 In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell,4 2 the California
Supreme Court held that "special taxes" were to be construed to mean
taxes levied for a specific purpose as opposed to taxes placed in the
general fund for general governmental purposes. 43 In Farrell, San
Francisco, a charter city and county, imposed a tax on the payrolls or
31. See CITRIN & LEW, supra note 3, at 7.
32. See KEMP, supra note 6, at 5; see also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 190.
33. See STATE ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMMiTTEE, THE PROPERTY TAX FOUR
YEARS AFrER PROPOSITION 13, at 3 (1982).
34. See KEMP, supra note 6, at 5; see also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 190.
35. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 190 n.36.
36. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
37. An ad valorem property tax is "[a] tax based on the value ... of property." VIR-
GINIA L. HORLER, GUIDE TO PUBLIC DEBT FINANCING IN CALIFORNIA 247 (1987).
38. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1 (requiring the "maximum amount of any ad
valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of
such property").
39. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a)-(b).
40. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
41. See City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935, 936 n.1 (Cal. 1982).
42. 648 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1982).
43. See id. at 940.
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gross receipts of businesses operating in the city.44 The proceeds of
the tax were to be placed in the city's general fund to be used for
general governmental expenditures. 45 The San Francisco Board of Su-
pervisors placed an initiative measure on the ballot proposing to ex-
tend the expiration date of an increase in the tax rate, which was
approved by 55% of voters.46 If the tax imposed by San Francisco con-
stituted a "special tax," then the measure would have failed under Pro-
position 13 because less than two-thirds of the electorate approved the
tax.47 The city's controller, Farrell, refused to certify that the funds
from the tax were available for expenditure because he believed the
tax was a "special tax" and thus did not meet the voter approval re-
quirement.48 The city petitioned the California Supreme Court for a
writ of mandate to compel Farrell to certify that funds were available
for expenditure. 49 The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate,
finding that the payroll and gross receipt taxes were general taxes not
subject to Proposition 13's voter approval requirements.5 0 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated: "There can be no doubt that the term
'special taxes' is ambiguous in the sense that it has been interpreted to
mean different things in different contexts."' The court attempted to
clarify the term and construed "special taxes . . . to mean taxes ...
levied for a specific purpose rather than.., a levy... to be utilized for
general governmental purposes." 52
The California Supreme Court also established that the term
"special tax" did not include special assessments.5 3 A special assess-
ment is a compulsory charge placed by government upon real prop-
erty within a district for the financing of a permanent public
improvement within the district.5 4 "A special assessment is 'levied
against real property particularly and directly benefited by a local im-
provement in order to pay the cost of that improvement.' 5 5 The ra-
44. See id. at 936.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 937.
47. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
48. See Farrell, 648 P.2d at 937.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 940.
51. Id. at 938.
52. Id. at 940.
53. See Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 149 (Cal. 1992) (noting the courts of
appeal have uniformly held that Article XIIIA's tax limitations do not apply to legitimate
special assessments).
54. See Spring St. v. City of Los Angeles, 148 P. 217, 219 (Cal. 1915).
55. Knox, 841 P.2d at 150 (quoting Solvang Municipal Improvement Dist. v. Board of
Supervisors, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 396 (Ct. App. 1980)).
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tionale behind charging a special assessment rather than imposing a
tax is that the assessed property has received a greater benefit than the
general public, and thus the owner of the benefited property should
pay more than the general public. 56 The California Supreme Court
found that in contrast to a special assessment, a tax, including a spe-
cial tax, confers benefits to the public generally.57 The court reasoned
that because a special assessment is different from a special tax, a two-
thirds vote of the electorate was not required to impose a special as-
sessment.58 The result of the California Supreme Court's exclusion of
special assessments from Proposition 13's requirements was an in-
crease in the use of special assessments by local governments, which
were faced with constraints on generating sources of revenue.59
Eighteen years after Proposition 13's approval, proponents of
Proposition 218 would claim "[s] pecial districts have increased assess-
ments by over 2400% over 15 years. Likewise, cities have increased
utility taxes 415% and raised benefit assessments 976%, a ten-fold in-
crease."60 In addition, a variety of levies, fees, and "hidden taxes" such
as the sales tax were increased to make up for the sharp drop in reve-
nues from property taxes. 61
After Proposition 13, politicians became creative in their hunt for
new sources of revenue to keep government running. They added
parking meters and began charging soccer leagues for use of pub-
lic parks .... Above all, they created hundreds of new special dis-
tricts to tax property owners in exchange for providing services
from lighting streets to fighting fires. 62
Attempts by local governments to finance services with alternative
sources of revenue following Proposition 13 would be thwarted by fur-
ther taxpayer resistance.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 149.
59. See STATE ASSEMBLY REVENUE & TAXATION COMMITTEE, supra note 33, at 4 (noting
that with the growth in assessments property tax revenues grew from $5.561 billion in the
fiscal year following Proposition 13's passage to $7.976 billion in fiscal year 1982-83).
60. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 5, 1996 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 76 (Aug.
12, 1996).
61. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 193-94; see also Stephanie Simon, 20 Years Later,
Prop. 13 Still Has Big Impact, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at Al (noting that California home-
owners have saved billions of dollars since 1978, but no one can say exactly how much
because of proliferating fees).
62. Simon, supra note 61, at Al.
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B. Proposition 62
Taxpayers approved Proposition 62 in November of 1986.63 This
initiative further restricted the ability of local government to levy
taxes.64 The proposition was placed on the ballot in response to the
California Supreme Court's interpretation of Proposition 13, which
supporters of Proposition 62 claimed took away the voter's right to
vote on city and county tax increases by creating "loopholes" in Pro-
position 13.65
In Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino,66
the California Supreme Court declared a sales tax invalid under Pro-
position 62.67 The Santa Clara Local Transportation Authority pro-
posed a sales tax to fund certain transportation projects. 68 A majority
approved the tax, but less than two-thirds of the voters. 69 The Santa
Clara Local Transportation Authority filed for a writ of mandate to
validate the tax contending the imposition of the tax did not violate
Proposition 62.70 The court felt that a review of Proposition 62's his-
tory was fundamental to understanding its language.71
The manifest purpose of Proposition 62 as a whole was to increase
the control of the citizenry over local taxation by requiring voter
approval of all new local taxes imposed by all local governmental
entities: the measure defines broadly and inclusively both the taxes
([section] 53721) and the entities ([section] 53720) to which it
applies.72
Proposition 6273 states that all taxes are either general taxes or
special taxes.74 Special and general taxes are given the same defini-
tions the California Supreme Court used in Farrell.75 Special taxes are
63. Proposition 62 was a statutory initiative, codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 53720-53730 (West 1997).
64. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53722 (West 1997).
65. See Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 902 P.2d 225, 234 (Cal.
1995); see also Throckmorton, supra note 16, at 1065.
66. 902 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1995).
67. See id. at 228.
68. See id. at 229.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 234 (stating that "on this question we agree with Justice Holmes that 'a
page of history is worth a volume of logic"' (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921))).
72. Id.
73. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53720-53730 (West 1997).
74. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53721 (West 1997).
75. See Guardino, 902 P.2d at 232. The court stated: "Proposition 62 defines 'special'
and 'general' taxes in the terms we used in Farrell ... section 53721 provides that 'all taxes
are either special taxes or general taxes. General taxes are taxes imposed for general gov-
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taxes levied for a specific purpose rather than a tax to be used for
general governmental purposes. 76 Proposition 62 requires two-thirds
approval by local voters of any special tax. 77 However, only a majority
approval is required for increases in general taxes. 78 The Guardino
court reasoned that the narrowness of the purpose of the Santa Clara
Local Transportation Authority's tax fit the definition of a special
tax.7 9 Therefore, Proposition 62's broad terms governed its ap-
proval.80 Due to the fact that the requisite two-thirds vote was not ob-
tained, the tax was declared invalid.8'
The Guardino court also reviewed the decisions of two separate
appellate courts that found portions of Proposition 62 unconstitu-
tional for providing illegal referendums on taxes under the California
Constitution.82 The referendum is the power of the electors to ap-
prove or reject statutes or parts of statutes. 83 The California Constitu-
tion prohibits subjecting tax statutes to a referendum. 84 The Guardino
court expressly overruled one of these decisions and found Proposi-
tion 62 constitutional.85 The court reasoned that Proposition 62 "is a
condition precedent to the enactment of each [proposed] tax statute
to which it applies, while the constitutional referendum may be in-
voked only after the statute has been enacted. '86 Also, "a statute sub-
ject to Proposition 62 does not become law until [it has been
approved by voters], while a statute subject to referendum automati-
ernmental purposes. Special taxes are taxes imposed for specific purposes."' Id. (quoting
CAL. GoVT CODE § 53721 (West 1997)).
76. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53721.
77. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53722 (West 1997).
78. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53723 (West 1997).
79. See Guardino, 902 P.2d at 232 (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 180001(c) (West
1991), stating that the purpose of the tax at issue was funding local transportation mainte-
nance and improvement needs "with the proceeds of the tax specifically allocated to the
construction, improvement, and operation of local transportation facilities").
80. See id.
81. See id. at 228,
82. See City of Woodlake v. Logan, 282 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
Proposition 62's requirement of majority approval for the imposition of general taxes was
an unconstitutional referendum on taxes); City of Westminster v. County of Orange, 251
Cal. Rptr. 511 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Proposition 62's "window period" provision,
which required that any local taxes imposed in the sixteen months prior to the effective
date of the proposition be submitted for approval by a majority of the voters, was an uncon-
stitutional referendum on taxes).
83. See CAL CoNsT. art. 1I, § 9.
84. See id.
85. See Guardino, 902 P.2d at 241 (finding the decision in Woodlake erroneous and
disapproving of it).
86. Id. at 237.
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cally becomes law unless the voters themselves take the initiative and
petition to disapprove it."87 Thus, the court found Proposition 62 was
not an unconstitutional referendum. 88
Although Proposition 62 successfully closed the general tax loop-
hole of Proposition 13, assessments and fees remained unaffected by
its provisions.8 9 Therefore, assessments and fees became an attractive
alternative for raising local government revenues.9 0
C. Proposition 218
Dissatisfied with the increase in assessments,9 ' on November 6,
1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, entitled the "Right
to Vote on Taxes Act," adding articles XIIIC and XIIID to the Califor-
nia Constitution.92 Proposition 218 stated:
The people of the State of California ... declare that Proposition
13 was intended to provide effective tax relief and to require voter
approval of tax increases. However, local governments have sub-
jected taxpayers to excessive tax, assessment, fee and charge in-
creases that ... frustrate the purposes of voter approval for tax
increases .... 93
The purposes of Proposition 218 were to limit the "methods by which
local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their con-
sent"9 4 and prevent local governments from "frustrat[ing] the pur-
poses of voter approval for tax increases" as contemplated by
Proposition 13.95
Supporters of Proposition 218 argued that after voters passed
Proposition 13, "politicians created a loophole in the law that al-
low[ed] them to raise taxes without voter approval by calling taxes
'assessments' and 'fees.' Once this loophole was created, one lawyer
working with the politicians wrote, assessments 'are now limited only
by the limits of human imagination."' 96 Proposition 218 was, there-
fore, seen as guaranteeing citizens the right to vote on local tax in-
87. Id.
88. See id. at 237-38.
89. Proposition 62 only applies to special and general taxes. See CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 53720-53730 (West 1997).
90. See FREDERICK D. STOCKER, PROPOSITION 13: A TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 2 (1991);
see also KEMP, supra note 6, at 6.
91. See State Propositions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1996, at A21.
92. CAL. CONST. arts. XIIIC, XIIID.
93. CAL CONST. art. XIIIC, § 1 historical notes (West Supp. 2001).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 60, at 76.
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creases "even when they are called something else, like 'assessments'
or 'fees' and imposed on homeowners." 97
Not everyone was persuaded by the lure of Proposition 218's right
to vote on taxes. One critic warned: "Beware of wild claims for new
'constitutional rights' and people who pretend concern about widows
and orphans. Read Proposition 218 yourself and see how large corpo-
rations, big landowners and foreign interests gain more voting power
than YOU."98 Proposition 218 was seen by opposition groups as reduc-
ing the voting power of the average citizen as well as reducing the
services provided for by government.99 Opponents condemned Pro-
position 218 by claiming that it "cuts more than $100 million from
local services, yet wastes tens of millions each year by changing the
Constitution to require 5,000 local elections even if local citizens
don't want an election ... even if the election cost is more than the
potential revenue."100 Despite this criticism, Proposition 218 was ap-
proved by fifty-six percent of California voters. 10 1
Before the first provisions of Proposition 218 became effective on
July 1, 1997, the California Legislature adopted the Proposition 218
Omnibus Implementation Act 102 ("Omnibus Act"). The legislature
felt emergency legislation was necessary to clarify some of the provi-
sions of Proposition 218 so local governments could adopt their budg-
ets for the 1997-98 fiscal year without "needless confusion,
duplication of effort, and uncertainty" over the proposition's effect on
the funding of local services.103 The emergency legislation included a
list of definitions that applied to both Article XIIIC and Article XIIID
of the California Constitution and to the provisions of the Omnibus
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. Proposition 218 provided that, as an alternative to imposing a new fee or
increasing an existing fee by a vote of the local electorate, the agency seeking the new fee
could submit it for approval to the property owners of the property subject to the fee. See
CAL. CONST. art XIIID, § 6(c). If a majority of the property owners approved the fee, the
fee would be imposed. See id.
100. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 60, at 77.
101. See State Propositions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1996, at A21.
102. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53750-53753.5 (West Supp. 2001). The Proposition 218
Omnibus Implementation Act clarifies any of Proposition 218's inconsistencies with nu-
merous preexisting statutes. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 53750 historical notes. The Act in-
cludes a list of definitions for terms used, but not defined in Proposition 218. See id.
§ 53750. The Act outlines the notice, protest, and hearing procedures an agency must
follow when leaving or increasing assessments. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53753. Also included
in the Act is a list of assessments exempt from the procedures mentioned. See CAL. GoV'T
CODE § 53753.5.
103. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53750 historical notes.
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Act.10 4 However, the legislature did not define "property related fee"
in the Omnibus Act,'05 nor did it provide any guidance on the re-
quirements for a property related fee.'0 6
H. Problem
The lack of definition for the term "property related fee" means
that local governments must play a guessing game as to whether they
must submit a fee to a vote each time they wish to impose one. 10 7 To
date, there is no consensus as to which fees are property related and
thus subject to the requirements of Proposition 218.108 "[T] he defini-
tion of this term will be an important and sensitive issue for the Legis-
lature and the courts."' 0 9
A. The Language of Proposition 218
The first step toward resolving the confusion is to clarify the lan-
guage of Proposition 218 itself. Article XIIID of the California Consti-
tution provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
provisions of this article shall apply to all assessments, fees, and
charges, whether imposed pursuant to state statute or local govern-
ment charter authority."u 0 An "assessment" is defined as "any levy or
charge upon real property ... for a special benefit conferred upon
the real property.""' In order to constitute a fee, a levy must be im-
posed as an incident of property ownership." 2
Unfortunately, the authors of Proposition 218 did not define "an
incident of property ownership." 1 3 The lack of definition has created
confusion and uncertainty for local governments who must determine
whether they need to follow the requirements set forth in section 6 of
Article XIIID.1 14 The requirements with which a local government
104. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53750.
105. See id.
106. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 53753-53753.5 (explaining that the guidance provided in
the Act only applies to assessments).
107. See HILL, supra note 13, at 8.
108. See id. at 18.
109. Id. at 19.
110. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 1.
111. CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(b).
112. See id. § 2(e). "Fees" and "charges" are defined as "any levy other than an ad
valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed.., upon a parcel or upon a person as
an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for property related
service." Id.
113. See CAL. CONsT. arts. XIIIC, XIIID.
114. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(a).
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must comply when imposing a fee that is "an incident of property
ownership" include: (1) notice to identified property owners who
would be subject to the fee or charge; (2) a public hearing on the fee
or charge; and (3) rejection of the fee or charge if written protests
against the proposal are presented by a majority of the property own-
ers who will be subject to the fee or charge. 115 As an alternative to
receiving approval by a majority of the property owners, the agency
imposing the fee may opt to submit the fee to the electorate residing
in the affected area. 116 The fee must receive approval of two-thirds of
the electorate in order to be imposed. 1 7 The requirements impose a
considerable undertaking of time, energy, and money by an agency." 18
Thus, it is understandable that local governments would like resolu-
tion of what constitutes a fee imposed as an incident of property
ownership. 119
B. Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act
The legislature's failure to define "property related fee" in the
Omnibus Act has left many local governments without definitive gui-
dance on which fees are subject to the requirements of Proposition
218. Some analysts, including the drafters of Proposition 218, argue
that property related fees "include most fees commonly collected on
monthly bills to property owners, such as those for water delivery, gar-
bage service, sewer service, and storm water management fees."' 20
Others argue fees that vary by level of service (for example, a fee for
metered water usage) should not be considered a property related fee
under Proposition 218 because the fee is based on service usage,
rather than property ownership.' 21 There has been no guidance from
115. See id.
116. See id. § 6(c).
117. See id.
118. See Gaura, supra note 8, at A19. In her article, Gaura quotes Andrea Flores, an aide
to Santa Clara County Supervisor Blanca Alvarado frustrated with Proposition 218: "Think
of all the tax dollars spent on this process, all to debate a ($14) fee. It makes no sense." Id.
119. See David Danelski, Ruling May Aid Cities' Centers; An Appellate Court's Decision to
Allow Collection of Business Improvement District Fees Could Be a Boost for Downtowns, THE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, California), May 21, 1999, at B01 (following one local government's
confusion created by Proposition 218's unclear language, Corona City Manager Bill Work-
man said, "'I have in the past looked at these business improvement districts [fees] and
scratched my head as to whether Proposition 218 applied to those things.").
120. HILL, supra note 13, at 18-19.
121. See id. at 19.
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the legislature on how to determine which fees are within the scope of
Proposition 218.122
C. Direction from the Attorney General's Office
Various agencies have looked to the California Attorney General
for clarification on whether the requirements of Article XIIID apply to
the fees they are looking to impose.1 23 In examining the question of
whether a fee is imposed as an incident to property ownership, the
Attorney General has analyzed the issue in terms of whether the fee is
a charge for a property related service. 124 This definition is borrowed
from the definition of "fee" found in section 2(e) of Article XIIID. 125
A "property related service" is defined as "a public service having
a direct relationship to property ownership."1 26 Therefore, in render-
ing an opinion on whether a fee has been imposed as an incident of
property ownership, the Attorney General determines whether a fee
has a direct relationship to property ownership.' 27 For example, the
California Attorney General has determined that "[a] water charge
that is based upon the ownership of land and calculated based upon
the amount of land involved must be said to have a 'direct relation-
ship to property ownership."'128 Therefore, such a water charge would
be subject to the requirements of Article XIIID. 129
"On the other hand, a water charge that is imposed whether the
purchaser is a landowner or not, such as upon construction compa-
nies for filling their water tank trucks ...would not have a 'direct
122. The Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act did not address property re-
lated fees. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53750-53753.5 (West Supp. 2001).
123. See 82 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 43 (1999); 81 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 104 (1998); 80 Cal.
Op. Att'y Gen. 183 (1997). Although attorney general opinions are not binding on the
courts, they have been accorded great weight where controlling authority construing the
provision is absent. See San Diego Union v. City Counsel of the City of San Diego, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 49 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Corey v. Knight, 310 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957). The court in Corey stated:
where the attorney general has interpreted a law in a written opinion and that
position has been adopted by an administrative agency, the "administrative appli-
cation of an act is entitled to respect by the courts, and unless clearly erroneous is
a significant factor to be considered in ascertaining the meaning of a statute."
Id. (quoting Mudd v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1947)).
124. See 80 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 183 (1997).
125. See CAL. CONsT. art. XIIID, § 2(e) (defining a fee as "any levy ... imposed by an
agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a
user fee or charge for a property related service").
126. Id. § 2(h).
127. See 80 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 183, 185 (1997).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 183-84.
[Vol. 35
relationship to property ownership.' At most, the relationship would
be indirect in such circumstances." 130 Therefore, this type of fee based
only on usage, regardless of ownership, should not be subject to the
requirements of Article XIIID.' 31 According to the Attorney General,
"fees for water that are based upon metered amounts used are not
'imposed... as an incident of property ownership' and do not have a
'direct relationship to property ownership.' Consequently, such fees
would not be governed by Article XIIID of the Constitution."' 32
If the Attorney General's guidance is followed, whether a fee is
imposed as an incident of property ownership would be determined
by the directness of the relationship to property ownership. If a fee is
directly related to property ownership because it is based solely on the
fact that one owns property, then the fee will be subject to the require-
ments of Proposition 218.133 If a fee is only indirectly related to prop-
erty ownership, such as a fee based on service regardless of ownership,
then the fee will not be subject to the requirements of Proposition
218.134 Although the determination of directness to property owner-
ship may clearly guide certain instances of imposing a fee, confusion
still abounds due to the indeterminable nature of certain fees.
D. Conflict in the Courts
The lack of clarity over what constitutes a fee imposed as an inci-
dent of property ownership for the purposes of Proposition 218 has
created confusion and conflict in the courts of appeal. For example,
two contradictory opinions were announced by two separate divisions
of the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal regarding the
applicability of Article XIIID to the imposition of similar fees upon
rental property.135
130. Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
131. See id. at 186.
132. Id. See also 81 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 104, 107 (1998) (opining that because a "storm
drainage system is intended to serve directly the property within the drainage area" the
monthly fees on the system would be "property related"); 82 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 43, 46
(1999) (opining that a "District's per-acre charge for delivering irrigation water to land-
owners is a fee for a property-related service [and] is imposed as an incident of property
ownership").
133. See generally 82 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 43 (1999); 81 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 104 (1998).
134. See 80 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 183, 185 (1997).
135. See Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 01
C.D.O.S. 219 (Cal. Jan. 8, 2001); Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., Nos. B116056 and B117325 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1998).
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In Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board,136 Di-
vision Seven of the Second Appellate District held that "[a] n annual
fee assessed by a rent control board against owners of rental units,
used entirely to defray regulatory costs, is imposed only because prop-
erty is used for rental and is not 'incident to property ownership.'" 13 7
The court concluded the fee was not, therefore, subject to the re-
quirements of Proposition 218.138 The court reasoned that "[a] regu-
latory fee charged to persons engaged in a regulated business, and
used only to cover the expenses of the regulator, is not a ... fee inci-
dent to the ownership of property."139 The court noted that the fees
were only charged to a small subset of property owners (those who
operate rental businesses) and not to all property owners in gen-
eral.1 40 The court relied on Pennell v. City of SanJose,14 1 where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a fee charged to cover the costs of
operation of a San Jose rent control ordinance, and not used to raise
general revenue, was not subject to taxation limits added to the Cali-
fornia Constitution by Proposition 13.142 Therefore, according to Divi-
sion Seven of the Second Appellate District, regulatory fees charged to
those in a business are not property related fees.143
Division One of the Second Appellate District rendered a contra-
dictory opinion regarding a similar type of fee in Apartment Ass'n of Los
Angeles County.144 The City of Los Angeles imposed the fee on owners
of all residential rental properties with two or more dwellings for the
financing of an inspection program to eradicate substandard hous-
ing. 145 The court held that the fee was "imposed 'upon a parcel or
upon a person as an incident of property ownership' and [was], therefore,
subject to the procedural requirements of Proposition 218."146 Unlike
the Action Apartment Ass'n court, the court in Apartment Ass'n of Los
Angeles I disregarded the trial court's distinction that such a fee was
"not one 'imposed by virtue of ownership per se' and, therefore not
one within the reach of Proposition 218-because it [was] imposed
136. Nos. B116056 and B117325 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1998).
137. Id. at 31.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 32.
140. See id.
141. 721 P.2d 1111 (Cal. 1986).
142. See id. at 1118.
143. See Action Apartment Ass'n, Nos. Bl16056 and B117325, at 32.
144. 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 01 C.D.O.S. 219 (Cal. Jan. 8, 2001).
145. See id. at 257.
146. Id. at 258 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(e)) (alteration in original).
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only on the owners of rental units, not on all property owners."1 47
Rather, the appellate court found that the "fee [fell] squarely within
the four corners of Proposition 218."148
Our task begins and ends with the determination that it is the in-
tent of the voters who adopted this constitutional provision that
must control. Where, as here, that intent is apparent from the
words of Proposition 218, there is no need for construction, and
no need for further analysis. By imposing a fee upon all "residen-
tial rental properties with two or more dwellings," the City has im-
posed a new fee upon the property or its owner "as an incident of
property ownership, [as] a user fee or charge for a property related
service."
14 9
The fee was declared invalid because the city failed to follow the pro-
cedures set forth in section 6 of Article XIIID. 150
The Fourth Appellate District issued an opinion similar in ratio-
nale to the Second Appellate District's decision in Action Apartment
Ass'n, holding that a municipal rental unit tax assessed against rental
property owners based on their use of their properties was not subject
to the requirements of Proposition 218.151 In Teyssier v. City of San Di-
ego, 152 the court reasoned that the city imposed its charge on the busi-
ness of renting residential property, rather than taxing the ownership
of property.1 53 The property owner can avoid taxation by not engag-
ing in the privilege taxed.1 54 Thus, the court interpreted the phrase
"fee or charge.., imposed.., upon a person as an incident of prop-
erty ownership" to mean "fees that a person must pay solely because
that person owns property and for no other reason." 155 The court
found that by its very language, Proposition 218 applies only to "fees
147. Id. (quoting the trial court).
148. Id. at 259.
149. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(e)) (alteration in original).
150. See id.
151. See Teyssier v. City of San Diego, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100 (Ct. App. 2000), review
granted and opinion superceded, 8 P.3d 338 (Cal. 2000). The Teyssier court distinguished the
tax before it from the tax challenged in Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles I, stating:
There, all residential rental properties with two or more dwellings were subject to
regular inspection; the annual service fee was imposed regardless of whether the
unit was rented or empty .... In contrast, the [tax] here is neither a user nor a
service fee, but rather a residential rental component of the business tax. It is
expressly not intended for regulation.
Id. at 109 n.12.
152. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100 (Ct. App. 2000), review granted and opinion superceded, 8 P.3d
338 (Cal. 2000).
153. See id. at 105.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 106.
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levied strictly as an incident of property ownership, without any addi-
tional condition precedent." 156
In Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,157 Division
Four of the Second Appellate District affirmed an order of dismissal
because the plaintiffs failed to show the challenged water usage fee
constituted a property related fee or tax. 158 The plaintiffs claimed that
payments for water services are essentially property related fees or spe-
cial taxes and are thus subject to Proposition 218's requirements. 159
The appellate court rejected this argument. 160 The court reasoned
that "the supply and delivery of water does not require that a person
own ... the property where the water is delivered. ' 16' Rather, the
charges are based upon the amount of water used. 62 Thus, the fee is
"not incident to or directly related to property ownership. ' 163 The
court held "[t] hese usage rates are basically commodity charges which
do not fall within the scope of Proposition 218."1 64
As these cases exemplify, due to the confusing and vague lan-
guage of Proposition 218, there are conflicting views as to what the
term "incident of property ownership" actually means. There must be
resolution of the construction of the term so that the local govern-
ment and its citizens do not have to forego services.
E. Some Guidance from the California Supreme Court
On January 8, 2001, the California Supreme Court reversed the
decision of Division One of the Second Appellate District in Apartment
Ass'n of Los Angeles County J,165 and held that a municipal regulatory
fee imposed on the owners of rental property was not a fee imposed
on property ownership and, therefore, not subject to Proposition
218's provisions.166 The court reasoned that "the inspection fee is not
156. Id. at 107.
157. 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905 (Ct. App. 2000). The plaintiffs in HowardJarvis were two
non-profit corporations, the HowardJarvis Taxpayers Association and the Apartment Asso-
ciation of Los Angeles County, Inc., and three individuals, Ivan Shinkle, Harold Green-
berg, and Mark Dolan. See id. at 905-06. They brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of all
individuals and entities who paid for water services in the City of Los Angeles. See id. at 906.
158. See id. at 909.
159. See id. at 906.
160. See id. at 908.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 144-156.
166. See Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles II, 01 C.D.O.S. 209, 209 (Cal. Jan. 8, 2001).
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imposed solely because a person owns property. Rather, it is imposed
because the property is being rented."1 67 The court found crucial to
the city's case the fact that the fee would cease if the business opera-
tion (renting the property) ceased, regardless of who owned the
property. 168
In this case... the fee is imposed on landlords not in their capacity
as landowners, but in their capacity as business owners. The exac-
tion at issue here is more in the nature of a fee for a business li-
cense than a charge against property. It is imposed only on those
landowners who choose to engage in the residential rental busi-
ness, and only while they are operating the business. 169
The court further reasoned that the business of renting apart-
ments is not an incident of property ownership. 170 Although apart-
ments cannot be rented without owning them as property, it is
possible to own apartments and not rent them. The court interpreted
"as an incident of property ownership" as plainly meaning that Pro-
position 218 "applies only to exactions levied solely by virtue of prop-
erty ownership."'17 1
The court also looked to the directness of the relationship be-
tween the fee and property ownership as additional evidence that the
fee imposed by the city was not included within Proposition 218's
scope.1 72
It may be recalled that among the fees or charges covered by Arti-
cle XIIID, section 2, subdivision (e), is "a user fee or charge for a
property-related service." Such a service "means a public service
having a direct relationship to property ownership." In this case,
the relationship between the city's inspection fee and property
ownership is indirect-it is overlain by the requirement that the
landowner be a landlord. 7
The California Supreme Court found the indirectness of this fee to
property ownership removed the fee from the requirements of Pro-
position 218.174
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 211.
170. See id. at 212.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(e), (h)).
174. See id.
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III. Solution
A. Identifying the Purpose of Fees
The test used by the California Supreme Court in Apartment Ass'n
of Los Angeles County II should be broadened, so that all types of fees
may be analyzed under it. Therefore, to determine whether a fee is
property related for the purposes of Proposition 218, a court must
first look to the purpose of the fee.
If there is no purpose for the fee other than to raise revenue
from property owners, then the fee is property related and those who
seek to impose it must follow Proposition 218's requirements. How-
ever, if the fee is levied based on something other than mere property
ownership, the court must determine the directness of the relation-
ship between the fee and property ownership. If the relationship is
determined to be direct, then the fee is property related and must
adhere to Proposition 218. But if the fee is only indirectly related to
the fact a person owns property, such as fees based upon the opera-
tion of a business on the property or upon using property in a certain
manner, then the fee should not be subject to Proposition 218's re-
quirements. A characteristic of fees that are indirectly related is that
they are imposed because of the way property is being used and will
cease when that particular use ceases. Unlike the limited holding in
Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles II, which only determined the status of
regulatory fees imposed on owners of rental property, a test based
upon the directness of the fee's relationship to the property owner-
ship allows for the determination of whether Proposition 218 applies
to various types of fees. Allowing local governments to determine
whether a fee is likely to be deemed property related prior to impos-
ing a fee will provide greater certainty in the provision of public
services.
B. Use the Contemperaneous Construction of Local Governments
If there is doubt as to whether the fee's relationship to property
ownership is direct or indirect, courts should use the contemporane-
ous construction of the agency charged with meeting Proposition
218's requirements.175 In determining the scope of the term "incident
to property ownership," courts must use the rule of construction of
175. See Amador Valley Joint Union Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281 (Cal. 1978).
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vague terms established by the California Supreme Court in Amador
Valley Joint Union School District v. State Board of Equalization.176
In Amador Valley, the supreme court was confronted with multiple
constitutional challenges to Article XIIIA of the California Constitu-
tion. 177 One of the challenges by the Amador Valley Joint Union
School District, and numerous governmental agencies as amici, was
that Article XIIIA was void for vagueness. 178 The court, however,
found that Article XIIIA was not so vague as to render it void.179 In the
course of its analysis, the court enunciated several principles regard-
ing the construction of constitutional terms.180 The court held that
constitutional enactments "'must receive a liberal, practical common-
sense construction' which will meet 'changed conditions and the
growing needs of the people."' 18' The court reasoned that constitu-
tional amendments "should be construed in accordance with the nat-
ural and ordinary meaning of its words. The literal language of
enactments may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill
the apparent intent of the framers."' 8 2 Thus, because a court is al-
lowed to liberally construe a constitutional enactment, the court may
disregard the literal language of the enactment. 83
The court in Amador Valley then proceeded to allow some defer-
ence to the interpretation by local agencies of ambiguous terms in
constitutional enactments. 184 The court advised that, "[m]ost impor-
tantly, apparent ambiguities frequently may be resolved by the con-
temporaneous construction of the legislature or of the administrative
agencies charged with implementing the new enactment." 185 In addi-
tion, the court in Amador Valley held that when the enactment follows
voter approval, "the ballot summary and arguments and analysis
presented to the electorate in connection with a particular measure
may be helpful in determining the probable meaning of uncertain
language." 186
176. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
177. See id. at 1299. Article XIIIA sets forth the requirements imposed by Proposition
13. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
178. See Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1299.
179. See id. at 1300.
180. See id. at 1299-1300.
181. Id. at 1300 (quoting Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 382
'P.2d 583, 586 (Cal. 1963)).
182. Id. (citation omitted).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Under Amador Valley, when a fee is challenged a court should give
deference to the judgment of the agencies charged with implement-
ing Proposition 218 in determining whether it must satisfy the proce-
dural requirements of Proposition 218 before imposing or increasing
a particular fee. 18 7 According deference to these local agencies will
allow them to meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the
people. 88 The rules of construction set forth in Amador Valley provide
for the liberal construction of the terms of constitutional enactments
like Proposition 218. Indeed, by its very terms, Proposition 218 is to be
"liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local govern-
ment revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent."18i 9 Although local
agencies may be granted deference in their judgment of whether a fee
must meet the procedural requirements of Proposition 218, the
agency must still make that judgment by construing the terms of Pro-
position 218 in a manner that accords with the natural and ordinary
meaning of the words.190 Agencies must therefore remain cautious in
distinguishing between fees based only on ownership of property and
other fees indirectly related to property ownership. Thus, the lan-
guage of Proposition 218 is preserved, the intent of the voters is pre-
served, and local agencies may determine whether a fee is subject to
the requirements of Proposition 218 with greater certainty.
Conclusion
Voters passed Proposition 218 so that property owners could ex-
ercise greater control over the amount of money they pay to the gov-
ernment in connection with the ownership of their properties.
However, Proposition 218's failure to define a fee incident of property
ownership has created confusion and uncertainty over what fees must
meet the Proposition's requirements. In order for local governments
to both provide services and fulfill the intent of voters, the California
Supreme Court should adopt a test that focuses on the directness of
the relationship between the fee and ownership of property. If there is
doubt about the directness of the fee to property ownership, the con-
temporaneous construction of the local government should be given
deference. If such a test is adopted, perhaps there will again be cer-
tainty to death and taxes in California.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC, § 1 historical notes (West Supp. 2001).
190. See Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1300.
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